

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 1747

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
SUBJECT: CSCE: U.S. BRIEFING AND NAC DISCUSSION MARCH 29 ON
SECRETARY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW

FOR AMBASSADOR SHERER FROM RUMSFELD

I THINK YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN THE FOLLOWING REPORT OF THE CSCE
PORTION OF THE U.S. BRIEFING AND COUNCIL DISCUSSION MARCH 29 ON THE
SECRETARY'S RECENT TALKS IN MOSCOW:

BEGIN SUMMARY: CONSELOR SONNEFELDT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HARTMAN CONSULTED WITH ALLIES IN RESTRICTED NAC SESSION MARCH
29 ABOUT SECRETARY KISSINGER'S DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET LEADERS
IN MOSCOW. REVIEWING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ITEM BY ITEM,
U.S. REPS REPORTED THAT GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV DISCUSSED
CSCE AT SOME LENGTH, EXPRESSING DESIRE TO COMPLETE ALL THREE
STAGES OF CSCE BY EARLY SUMMER AND TO COMPLETE THIRD STATE
OF CSCE AT SUMMIT LEVEL. U.S. HAD POINTED OUT THAT PACE OF WORK
COULD PROBABLY NOT MATCH SOVIET TIMETABLE. ALLIES ASKED WHETHER
EVIDENT SOVIET DESIRE FOR RAPID CONCLUSION OF CSCE WOULD BE
REFLECTED IN POSITIVE SOVIET MOVES IN GENEVA. U.S. REPS REPLIED
THAT SOME SIGNS OF MOVEMENT HAD ALREADY OCCURRED IN GENEVA TALKS
AND THAT NAC SHOULD NOW PROMPTLY CONSIDER IN EACH BASKET WHAT A
REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME WOULD BE FOR THE WEST. RESPONDING
TO FURTHER ALLIED QUESTION, U.S. REPS SAID U.S. HAD NOT COMMITTED
ITSELF TO SOVIETS ON LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN CSCE STAGE III

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AND WOULD RESERVE JUDGMENT UNTIL CONTENTS OF FINAL AGREEMENT
BECAME MORE CLEAR. END SUMMARY.

1. ACTING SYG PANSA RECALLED THAT U.S. HAD ALREADY BRIEFED
NAC ON OBJECTIVES OF VISIT TO MOSCOW, AND SAID MEMBERS APPRE-

CIATED FACT THAT SECRETARY WAS SENDING HIS CLOSE AIDES BACK SO PROMPTLY TO INFORM NAC OF RESULTS.

2. IN GENERAL INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, SONNENFELDT SAID RECORDS OF TALKS WITH SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO BE FULLY ANALYZED TO INSURE THAT ALL NUANCES HAVE BEEN CAUGHT, AND THAT CONTEXT IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THUS, U.S. PERCEPTIONS ARE "SOMEWHAT PRELIMINARY". SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS NOT YET SEEN THE PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN REPORTING TO HIM BY TELEGRAM EACH DAY. IN A SENSE, ALLIES WERE GETTING AN ADVANCE REPORT; IF THERE WAS ANYTHING TO ADD LATER, WE WOULD OF COURSE DO SO.

3. AS EXPLAINED AT EARLY MARCH PREVIEW OF TRIP, SONNENFELDT SAID TALKS WERE PREPARATORY, AND WERE NOT INTENDED TO BE CONCLUSIVE; THIS WAS STANDARD PROCEDURE IN PREPARING FOR SUMMIT MEETINGS. U.S. SIDE HAD HAD 20 HOURS WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, WHO WAS GENERALLY ACCOMPANIED BY AIDES MENTIONED IN COMMUNIQUE. TALKS GENERALLY WERE MORE DISCIPLINED AND SYSTEMATIC THAN IN THE PAST. THERE WAS ONLY ONE MAJOR DEVIATION FROM SCHEDULE, ON WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27, WHEN SOVIETS HAD CALLED POLITBURO MEETING WHEN MARSHALL GRECHKO HAD RETURNED PREMATURELY FROM VISIT TO IRAQ. SUCH CHANGES IN SCHEDULE WERE NOT UNUSUAL, HOWEVER, IT HAD BEEN INTENDED THAT SOME OF THE MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD AT POLITBURO HUNTING LODGE. INSTEAD MEETINGS WERE HELD IN KREMLIN, EVIDENTLY BECAUSE OF INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY RUSSIAN WEATHER. SONNEFELDT THEN YIELDED FLOOR TO HARTMAN, WHO REPORTED ON SPECIFIC CSCE ASPECTS OF DISCUSSIONS.

4. HARMAN SAID BREZHNEV HAD BROUGHT CSCE UP IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, AND HE COME BACK TO IT SEVERAL TIMES. HE COMMENTED ON THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT CONFERENCE WAS TAKING, AND REFERRED TO "TRIVIALITIES" BEING PRESSED BY OTHERS FOR BASKET III. BREZHNEV REFERRED TO DOMESTIC LEGISLATION EACH TIME HE HARKED BACK TO BASKET III ITEMS.

5. BREZHNEV WAS ALSO QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, IN PARTICULAR THE VIEW OF OTHERS THAT THEY SHOULD APPLY
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TO ALL OF THE EUROPEAN USSR, AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE "A LITTLE PENTAGON" IF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION WERE EXPECTED TO APPLY TO MILITARY MOVEMENTS. HE DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT IF THERE WERE A MANEUVER AROUND KIEV, PERHAPS THAT COULD BE NOTIFIED. THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED WHAT A REINFORCED DIVISION WAS, WITH REFERENCE TO THE UK DRAFT CBM TEXT. THEY WERE RATHER NEGATIVE ON TROOP MOVEMENTS, AS OPPOSED TO MANEUVERS.

6. SOVIETS HAD ALSO STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. THEY WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT "PEACEFUL," OR "VOLUNTARY" CHANGE, BUT NOT COUPLED WITH INVIOABILITY. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE MIGHT INSTEAD BE LINKED WITH TEXT ON SOVEREIGNTY.

7. ON BASKET III ISSUES, THE SOVIETS HAD SAID THEY WERE INTERESTED IN ENHANCING EAST-WEST CONTACTS. SOVIETS HAD REFERRED TO EXCHANGES

OF PUBLICATIONS, TOURISM AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES. THEY HAD REFERRED ONCE TO EASING THE PLIGHT OF SEPARATE FAMILIES. THERE WAS ALWAYS A REFERENCE IN SPEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS TO DOMESTIC LAWS. ONLY IN HIS OPENING REMARKS HAD BREZHNEV ALSO MENTIONED LIMITATIONS OF CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH BASKET III ISSUES.

8. THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO BASKET II AND SOVIETS HAD NOT MENTIONED FOLLOW-UP MACHINERY. THEY HAD STRESSED THEIR HOPE TO WIND UP CONFERENCE QUICKLY, AND WONDERED IF IT COULD BE DONE PRIOR TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT'S VISIT (WHICH FOR PLANNING PURPOSES HAD BEEN THOUGHT OF AS IN LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER). ON LEVEL OF THEIR STAGE, HARTMAN REPORTED THAT BREZHNEV HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEND EVEN HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO SIGN A BAD DOCUMENT.

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9. ON TIMING, U.S. HAD REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT THINK CSCE COULD BE FINISHED AS SOON AS SOVIETS WOULD LIKE, BUT WE AND, WE BELIEVE, OUR ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO MOVE PROMPTLY TO TRY TO BRING IT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

10. AS FOR RESOLUTION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES, U.S. HAD OBSERVED THAT UK TEXT ON CBMS COULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN GENEVA. TIME REQUIRED FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS WAS A SUBJECT THAT COULD BE DISCUSSED, IN U.S. VIEW. ON INVOLABILITY, THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN SOME EVIDENT PROGRESS IN GENEVA. PERHAPS LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL CHANGE COULD BE DEVELOPED IN A SEPARATE PAPER; THEN THERE COULD BE A DISCUSSION OF WHERE TO PUT IT. U.S. MADE POINT THAT THERE IS A LINK BETWEEN SOVIET PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC LEGISLATION

IN BASKET III ISSUES, AND PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE UNDER BASKET I. DUTCH TEXT COULD BE A STEP IN DIRECTION OF RESOLVING ISSUE, SINCE IT REFERS TO PRINCIPLES IN BASKET III PREAMBLE. HOWEVER, SOVIET EFFORT ON THESE ISSUES WOULD BE NECESSARY; SOVIETS HAD NOT YET SUFFICIENTLY PRESENTED THEIR VIEWS.

11. AS FOR LEVEL OF THIRD STATE, U.S. TOLD SOVIETS THIS WILL

HAVE TO BE DECIDED AS WORK PROCEEDS ON STAGE TWO, BUT WE ARE STILL PREPARED TO CONSIDER A CONCLUDING PHASE AT ANY LEVEL UP TO THE HIGHEST. HARTMAN ADDED THAT ALLIES IN NAC SHOULD NOW DISCUSS WHAT IS A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FOR CSCE STAGE TWO. COUNCIL SHOULD SERIOUSLY ADDRESS WHAT ALLIES WOULD FIND SATISFACTORY IN TEXT OF FINAL DOCUMENT, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF EASTER CSCE

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BREAK.

12. DE STAERCKE OPENED ALLIED COMMENTS ON CSCE BY NOTING THAT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW SEEMED TO OFFER BETTER PROSPECTS THAN WHAT WAS BEING SAID IN GENEVA. HARTMAN OBSERVED THAT SOVIET DESIRE TO SPEED PACE OF CONFERENCE HAD IN OUR VIEW ALREADY BEEN EVIDENT IN GENEVA EVEN BEFORE MOSCOW TRIP. WE HAD BEEN STRUCK, FOR INSTANCE, BY SIGNS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON INVIOABILITY AND PEACEFUL CHANGE AND WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS CERTAIN BASKET III ITEMS.

13. FOLLOWING UP DESTAERCKE'S QUESTION, KRAPF (GERMANY) ASKED IF U.S. INTERPRETED SOVIET VIEWS ON INVIOABILITY AS A STEP FORWARD FROM THE POSITION TAKEN BY SOVIETS IN BREZHNEV'S EARLIER LETTERS TO WESTERN CHIEFS OF STATE. HARTMAN SAID BONN OFFICIALS WITH WHOM U.S. PARTY HAD SPOKEN EN ROUTE TO MOSCOW HAD PERCEIVED SOME LOOSENING IN THE SOVIET POSITION. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAD DRAWN THE LINE AGAINST HAVING INVIOABILITY AND PEACEFUL CHANGE IN THE SAME PRINCIPLE. U.S. IS AWARE THAT THIS IS A MATTER OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO GERMANY.

14. KRAPF, DE STAERCKE, AND A/SYG COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON PROBLEM OF TRANSLATING SIGNS OF SOVIET FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE INTO SPECIFICS IN GENEVA. HARTMAN REPEATED THAT MANY OF THESE SIGNALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN GIVEN IN GENEVA. OUR ANALYSIS IS THAT SOVIETS ARE BEGINNING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH DETAILS OF CSCE TEXTS.

15. MENZIES (CANADA) ASKED ABOUT ROLE OF GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN BILATERAL TALKS. DID HE HAVE A BROAD CONCEPT OF CSCE ISSUES, OR DID HE GET CAUGHT UP IN DETAILS? DID HE SEE THEM IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS? DID HE THINK, IN A LONG TIME FRAME OR DID HE HAVE MORE IMMEDIATE GOALS IN MIND?

16. SONNEFELDT SAID THAT AFTER A REVIEW OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST IN GENERAL, THE POLITBURO HAD REACHED A DECISION TO PURSUE THE CURRENT GENERAL LINE. PERHAPS THIS PROVIDES AN ANSWER TO THE RECENT DEBATE OVER POSSIBLE SOVIET DOUBTS ABOUT THE U.S.S. R.'S GENERAL APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. MOREOVER, A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME TO CSCE WOULD FIT INTO AN OVERALL CONCEPT OF CONTINUING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AS IN THE PAST FEW YEARS. "IRREVERSIBILITY" SHOULD PERHAPS BE SEEN IN THIS LIGHT.

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17. BUSCH (NORWAY) SAID HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD

NOT RAISED THE SUBJECT OF CSCE FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT RAISED THIS DURING THE NORWEGIAN PRIMIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, THUS MARKING THE THIRD TIME IN RECENT HIGH-LEVEL EAST-WEST MEETINGS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT REFERRED TO CSCE FOLLOW-ON. HE WONDERED IF ANY CONCLUSIONS COULD BE DRAWN FROM THIS.

18. HARTMAN SAID HE WOULD QUESTION DRAWING ANY CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ABANDONED AN INTEREST IN CSCE FOLLOW-ON. HIS OWN FEELING WAS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME BACK TO FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS WHEN THEY SEE HOW THE THREE BASKETS HAVE BEEN SORTED OUT.

19. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) AGREED WITH DE STAERCKE THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN GENEVA AND THEIR REMARKS IN MOSCOW. HE HAD NOT SEEN REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA WERE CHANGING THEIR POSITIONS. HARTOGH COMMENTED THAT THE DUTCH DELEGATION HAD PERHAPS BEEN THE MOST STUBBORN IN ITS PURSUIT OF CSCE GOALS. IF, THEN, THE SOVIETS ARE PRESSING FOR AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO CSCE AND ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO SOFTEN THEIR POSITION, MAYBE THIS DUTCH TECHNIQUE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. PERHAPS THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, MAKE A PREPAYMENT ON "VOLUNTARY CHANGE" IN THE HOPE OF GETTING SOVIET MOVEMENT ON BASKET III.

20. HARTMAN SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE A TACTICAL MISTAKE TO LINK SPECIFIC CSCE ISSUES IN THE ABOVE WAY. ALL OF THESE ISSUES MUST BE SORTED OUT SO THAT WE CAN DETERMINE WHICH ONES ARE REALLY BASIC TO A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE COUNCIL TO COMPARE NOTES ON WHAT IS GOING ON IN GENEVA. HE SAID THAT NO ONE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE A FINAL DETERMINATION ON A SATISFACTORY CSCE OUTCOME UNTIL ALL THE ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL BALANCE WERE CLEAR. HE SAID THAT EACH CSCE AREA SHOULD THEREFORE BE EXPLORED TO DETERMINE THE IMPORTANT ISSUES IN WHICH THE ALLIES WANT TO DEEP ON THE PRESSURE.

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21. DE STAERCKE ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT THE ALLIES SHOULD USE RECENT IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET ATTITUDES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON CSCE.

22. HARTMAN SAID THAT ALL THE ALLIES SHOULD TRY TO DRAW OUT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES AND IDENTIFY THE ISSUES WHICH THE WEST CONSIDERS IMPORTANT, AS WELL AS TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO BRING CSCE TO A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.

23. OFFERING A PERSONAL IMPRESSION, SONNEFELDT SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS SOME IMPATIENCE ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THIS GIVES THE WEST SOME LEVERAGE BUT NOT MUCH. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE LIMITS TO WHAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO CONCEDE. THE SOVIETS ALSO PROBABLY FEEL THAT IF THE DEBATE DRAWS ON TOO LONG, THIS WOULD DETRACT FROM THE ATMOSPHERE WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD HOPED TO ACHIEVE BY CSCE. SONNEFELDT SAID THAT THERE WAS SOME SOVIET SENSE OF DIMINISHING RETURNS IF CSCE WERE TO GO ON BEYOND A CERTAIN POINT, PARTICULARLY IF THE SOVIET POSITIONS ON BASKET III WERE PLACED IN SPECIAL FOCUS. SONNEFELDT SAID THAT ALTHOUGH, AS THE ALLIES KNEW, CSCE HAD NEVER BEEN A FAVORITE U.S. UNDERTAKING, IT MIGHT NOT BE USEFUL TO DRAG OUT THE CONFERENCE.

24. HARTMAN NOTED THAT THE U.S., AS HAD POMPIDOU DURING HIS RECENT SOVIET VISIT, HAD MADE THE POINT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WERE ALSO PRESENT AT GENEVA. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NEUTRALS HAD PARTICULAR VIEWS ABOUT SUCH THINGS AS CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
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MEASURES.

25. SVART (DENMARK) SAID IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO EXPLORE POSSIBLE LINKS IN CSCE BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLES GUIDING STATE RELATIONS AND BASKET III.

26. HARTMAN REPLIED THAT ONLY IN BREZHNEV'S FIRST PRESENTATION ON CSCE DID HE MENTION BROAD SWEEPING CONCEPTS LIKE "CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS". HE GENERALLY USED THE PHRASE "DOMESTIC LEGISLATION." A POSSIBLE SOLUTION MIGHT EMERGE WERE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT SOME REFERENCE TO SUCH TERMINOLOGY AS "DOMESTIC LEGISLATION" RATHER THAN VAGUE CONCEPTS LIKE "CUSTOMS." HE NOTED THAT THE DUTCH PREFATORY LANGUAGE IN BASKET III REFERS TO THE BASKET I DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. IF THE SOVIETS COULD FOCUS ON THAT FORMULATION AND ON A POSSIBLE REFERENCE TO "DOMESTIC LEGISLATION", NOT TO "CUSTOMS", THIS MIGHT PROVIDE A SOLUTION.

27. DE ROSE (FRANCE) ASSUMED THAT A SATISFACTORY CSCE OUTCOME FOR THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A RAPID CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE, WITH THE FEWEST CONCESSIONS, AND WITH THE CONCLUDING CEREMONIES STAGED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. DE ROSE SAID THE FRENCH DELEGATION IN GENEVA HAD SENT THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT PUTTING "VOLUNTARY CHANGE" UNDER THE SOVEREIGNTY PRINCIPLE. HE WONDERED IF THE

SOVIETS MIGHT NOT BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW SUCH SUGGESTIONS IN ORDER TO GET RAPID AGREEMENT. HE ALSO WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY PRESUMED THAT CSCE WOULD CONCLUDE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OR DO THEY THINK THAT THIS QUESTION REMAINS UNSETTLED.

28. HARTMAN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE LATTER ISSUE. THE U.S. HAS NOT COMMITTED ITSELF TO ANY PARTICULAR LEVEL.

29. ITALIAN CHARGE BETTINI ASKED IF THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS HAD REVEALED SOVIET THOUGHTS ON WHAT MIGHT BE A REALISTIC CLOSING DATE FOR THE SCCE.

30. HARTMAN RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO THINK THE CSCE WILL WIND UP IN SHORT ORDER AND HAD EVEN MENTIONED MOVING TO STAGE III BEFORE THE END OF JUNE. THE U.S. HAD POINTED OUT TO THE SOVIETS THAT SUCH A TIMETABLE WAS TOO AMBITIOUS AND THAT
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EVEN WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD ON ALL SIDES THE U.S. DID NOT SEE HOW CSCE COULD CONCLUDE BEFORE JULY.

31. ASYG PANSANOTED THAT A DATE HAD BEEN SET FOR A COUNCIL MEETING WITH ALLIED CSCE DELEGATES. THE ABOVE QUESTION, INCLUDING THE LEVEL AND TIMING OF STAGE III, SHOULD BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA FOR THAT MEETING. HE THOUGHT THE MEETING WOULD ALSO PROVIDE A USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR CSCE DELEGATIONS TO COMPARE NOTES AND IMPRESSIONS.

32. FISCHBACH (LUXEMBOURG) WONDERED IF CSCE WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUMMIT. SONNEFELDT SAID THAT IN THE LIKELY EVENT THAT THE CSCE HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED IN ALL ITS ASPECTS IN THE TIMEFRAME OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT, THE QUESTION PROBABLY WOULD ARISE IN US/ SOVIET BILATERALS. IN THIS EVENT, U.S. SIDE WOULD AGAIN TRY TO MOVE SOVIETS TOWARD ALLIED POSITIONS.

33. A/SYG PANSANOTED MEETING, REITERATING GREAT APPRECIATION ON THE PART OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE PROMPT AND VERY HELPFUL U.S. BRIEFING. RECALLING SONNEFELDT'S OFFER TO RELAY ANY FURTHER INFORMATION

OR ANALYSIS AFTER REVIEW OF VISIT IN WASHINGTON, PANSANOTED THAT NAC WOULD WELCOME THIS. HE READ OUT TEXT OF BRIEF PRESS ANNOUNCE-

MENT MERELY STATING THAT SONNEFELDT AND HARTMAN HAD VISITED NAC TO REPORT ON MOSCOW VISIT. RUMSFELD AND SONNEFELDT STRESSED AGAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE U.S. REPORT.
RUMSFELD

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